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Abstract  The study of political communication in Canada’s provinces suffers from an 
absence of pan-Canadian information. This descriptive article bridges the gap by 
documenting some observable trends. It submits that negative advertising is more intense 
in larger provinces than in smaller jurisdictions. Permanent campaigning is the new normal 
as electioneering ramps up in anticipation of a fixed date election. Provincial parties and 
citizens avail themselves of new technology by communicating with digital video, which is 
not subject to the same financial, technical, content or regulatory constraints as television. 
Similarities of political communication across Canada are noted, including copycatting of 
federal-level practices.  
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campaigning, fixed date elections, new information and communication technologies, video 
communication. 
 
 
Résumé: Les études en communication politique au Canada souffrent de l’absence 
d’observations pancanadiennes. Cet article descriptif comble cette lacune en documentant 
les tendances observables. Il soutient que la publicité négative est utilisée de manière plus 
intensive dans les grandes provinces que dans les plus petites juridictions. La campagne 
permanente est devenue la nouvelle norme, alors que l’électoralisme s’accélère dans 
l’attente d’une élection à date fixe. Les partis provinciaux et les citoyens tirent profit des 
nouvelles technologies en communiquant au moyen de vidéos, lesquels ne sont pas soumis 
aux mêmes contraintes financières, techniques et règlementaires qu’à la télévision. Les 
similitudes entre les pratiques de communication politique utilisées à travers le Canada 
sont constatées, incluant l’imitation des pratiques au niveau fédéral. 
 
Mots-clés: politique provinciale, communication politique, publicité négative, campagne 
permanente, élections à date fixe, technologies de l’information et de la communication, 
communication vidéo. 
 
 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 14-27 
15 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Negative advertising is a scourge 
of American politics (e.g., Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar 1995), and an unwelcome 
phenomenon that has come to 
characterize Canadian politics. In recent 
years the Conservative Party of Canada 
has deployed negative advertising 
through multiple media platforms. This 
was designed to damage the public image 
of Stéphane Dion, Michael Ignatieff, Bob 
Rae and Justin Trudeau as soon as each 
man became leader of the Liberal Party of 
Canada. According to Ira Basren of the 
CBC, it is a practice that was inspired by 
the U.S. Republican Party philosophy that, 
“You do not sidestep around your 
candidates’ vulnerabilities; you confront 
them head-on. You do not attack your 
opponent’s weak points; you attack his 
strengths” (Basren 2009).  
Conservative strategists recognize 
that negative advertising provokes fear. It 
highlights or distorts select policy 
positions of an opponent in a distasteful 
manner. The objective of “fear ads” is to 
stimulate voter anxiety and prompt 
electors to reconsider who they should 
support (Brader 2006: 6). Such ads can 
also extend the reach of the party’s media 
buy if they generate earned media with 
news organizations replaying or linking to 
party ads. The Conservative Party’s 
negative advertising was distasteful, but it 
introduced a critical lens through which 
Liberal leaders were judged, and 
contributed to the Liberal Party’s poor 
performance in the 2008 and 2011 
federal elections. 
Whether or not negative 
advertising is playing by the rules is a 
matter of debate. Assessing the ethical 
merits of negative communication is a 
subjective exercise because what one 
elector may deem immoral another may 
deem to be important information (Mark 
2006: 2). The rule of thumb is that going 
negative is risky if the message sponsor is 
ignorant of the believability of claims, 
overlooks that voters scrutinize political 
motivations and if there is a disregard for 
a “sense of fair play” (Pinkleton 1997: 21). 
It is interesting that negative campaigning 
is thought to be least effective in 
jurisdictions with small populations, 
because voters may personally know 
party leaders, or feel that they do, and 
opposing politicians may be friends (Mark 
2006: 177). This suggests that what 
happens in Canadian federal politics is 
not necessarily the norm in the diverse 
laboratories of provincial level 
campaigns. 
Controversy about negative 
advertising is growing with the 
prevalence of the permanent campaign. 
The concept is rooted in the party 
controlling the government leveraging the 
perks of office including availing of 
government communications staff, 
making spending decisions, coordinating 
pseudo-events and commissioning 
publicly-funded advertising and market 
research (Blumenthal 1980). But pre-
campaigning has evolved to engage all 
major political parties’ personnel in a 
“media-intensive, leader-focused, and 
round-the-clock style of campaigning” as 
though the next election is already 
underway (Gibson and Römmele 2001: 
34). The advantages of relentless 
campaigning include shaping the personal 
brand of a new leader, avoiding the 
clutter of competing messages, 
capitalizing on public attention to a 
controversy and, in Canada, escaping the 
constraints of pre-campaign and 
campaign spending limits (Table 1).  
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Table 1:  Advertising Spending Restrictions and Fixed Date Elections in Canada 
 
Jurisdiction Pre-campaign advertising restrictions Campaign 
spending limit* 
Fixed date election 
legislation 
Canada None. Political and election advertising 
are exempted from The Canadian Code of 
Advertising Standards, which does not 
hold the force of law.  
$21 million Passed 2006 
NL None. $1.6 million Passed 2004 
NS None. $1.7 million No  
PEI None. $0.8 million Passed 2007 
NB Parties may spend no more than $35,000 
annually on non-election advertising 
(Political Process Financing Act, sec. 50). 
$1.1 million Passed 2007 
QC None. $4.8 million Passed 2013 
ON Government advertising must be vetted 
by the Office of the Auditor General to 
verify that the ads are non-partisan 
(Government Advertising Act). 
$7.4 million Passed 2005 
MB In a fixed-date election year there is a 
limit of $268,000 for pre-campaign party 
advertising (Election Financing Act, sec. 
58). Government advertising is prohibited 
90 days before Election Day (sec. 92). 
$1.4 million Passed 2008 
SK In a non-election year, party advertising is 
capped at $274,898 (Election Act, sec. 
243). Government advertising is subject to 
limits in the four months prior to an 
election and is restricted 30 days 
beforehand, with some exceptions (sec. 
277). 
$0.9 million Passed 2007 
AB None. No limit imposed Passed 2011 
BC In the 60 days prior to a fixed-date 
election, political parties may not incur 
more than $1.1 million in expenses 
(Election Act, sec. 198). 
$4.6 million Passed 2001 
*Official campaign spending limit normally pertains to parties fielding candidates in all electoral 
districts. Dollar amounts are subject to inflation adjustments. Information is for most the most 
recent completed campaign as of 2014. Intended for illustrative purposes only. 
Sources: Election agencies and election legislation. 
 
However, permanent campaigning 
is a suspect use of public resources and its 
criticism contributes to negative 
democratic discourse. In some provinces 
there is legislation restricting such 
behaviour immediately prior to the writ 
of election being signed (again, Table 1) 
and all jurisdictions have campaign 
spending limits. Concerns about political 
communication are not magically solved 
through regulation, given that section 
2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
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guarantees the “freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of 
communication” (Canada 1982). 
Another reason for the prevalence 
of permanent campaigning is that the 
speed of communication has intensified. 
The 24/7 nature of political news, the 
expanding online sphere, and the mobility 
of smartphones enable political actors to 
engage in rapid exchanges of text, photos 
and video. The considerable 
developments associated with new 
communication technology are too 
extensive to list here. Suffice it to say that 
an emerging phenomenon is the growth 
of digital video, which has become 
inexpensive to create, edit, and 
disseminate. Social media sites like 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube lack the 
gatekeeping that pervades traditional 
media, which levels the playing field for 
small political parties, local candidates, 
and interest groups (e.g., Dylko et al. 
2012). It also opens up opportunities for 
citizens to participate and potentially 
attract mainstream news coverage, except 
they often lack the skills and resources to 
produce high-quality content.  
One outcome is that e-campaigning 
features material that is not suitable for 
mainstream media. Digital video can be 
longer than 30 seconds, can speak to a 
narrow segment of the electorate, and 
push the creative envelope. This includes 
the creation of political parody videos, 
some of which can be well-received and 
go viral, even if the intent was to inflict 
damage on an opponent without 
revealing the true identity of the video’s 
sponsor (Lim and Golan 2011).  
All of these interconnected topics – 
negative advertising, permanent 
campaigning, and digital video 
communication – warrant study at the 
federal level of Canadian politics, but 
there is a particular dearth of provincial 
level research. The following case study in 
the period surrounding the 2011 crop of 
provincial campaigns also considers 
politicking in a new era of fixed date 
election legislation. Knowing the 
anticipated date of the next election puts 
the parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary wings of all political 
parties on a stronger organizational 
footing and encourages them to actively 
mobilize rather than develop policy ideas 
(Perrella et al. 2008: 78-79).1 The election 
readiness of opposition parties pressures 
the governing party to engage in constant 
communication, which intensifies as the 
legislated election date approaches. 
 
Methodology 
 
This invites a number of questions 
about political communication in 
Canadian provinces that are discussed in 
the following descriptive study. What 
evidence is there of permanent 
campaigning at the provincial level? To 
what extent is negativity a feature of 
provincial politics? In what ways are 
provincial actors employing e-
communication as part of permanent 
campaigning and negative messaging? 
Indicators of these connected trends can 
be demonstrated by documenting 
campaign activity before the writ drop, by 
documenting examples of message tone, 
and by remarking on cases of e-
campaigning. Provincial campaigns are 
not insulated from global trends and we 
should anticipate finding evidence of each 
of these phenomena. Changes in 
communications technology mean that 
each activity is increasingly 
interconnected, and strategies and tactics 
are transcending jurisdictions and 
political parties. However, we lack a pan-
Canadian comparative account of their 
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existence, and should anticipate 
variations that reflect local political 
dynamics. The trend towards inter-
provincial and intra-party convergence is 
beginning to be understood through the 
lens of political branding (e.g., Wesley and 
Moyes 2014), which warrants separate 
study. 
A descriptive approach is 
employed to gather baseline indications 
of these phenomena at the provincial 
level. What follows is a qualitative 
account of a series of election case 
studies. It offers colour about 
campaigning dynamics and sets up 
empirical analysis for other studies. The 
method categorizes observations for the 
development of theory and testable 
generalizations in future undertakings.  
The gathering of qualitative data 
began with a review of provincial political 
studies. New evidence was collected from 
media reports in recent provincial 
campaigns. English-language news stories 
were identified by CPEP research 
assistants2 who performed daily 
monitoring of the websites of major 
provincial media outlets in autumn 2011 
for Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince 
Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan. Information for the most 
recent campaign in other provinces was 
obtained through a search of the media 
archive database Eureka.cc and case-
specific Google searches.3 As well, videos 
that were housed on political party 
websites in autumn 2011 were 
downloaded and reviewed in a non-
systematic manner; for the other 
provinces, select videos were identified 
through news coverage and were located 
online. Readers should bear in mind the 
limitations of this convenience sampling 
and descriptive analysis.4 Finally, in late 
2013, provincial election agencies were 
contacted to verify rules for pre-campaign 
political advertising. 
 
Findings 
 
1) Permanent Campaigning in the 
Provinces 
 
Provincial parties have a history of 
leveraging public resources for 
electioneering purposes. The British 
Columbia NDP used polling and 
advertising to persuade citizens to 
support the Nisga’a Treaty which became 
a key policy plank in its 1996 election 
platform (Ponting 2006), and the Alberta 
PCs availed of the government’s Public 
Affairs Bureau for political marketing 
purposes (Taft 1997). Conversely, 
Perrella et al. (2008) observed that in 
Ontario’s first fixed-date election in 2007 
there was little evidence of permanent 
campaigning, which the authors speculate 
was due to Ontarians’ inattentiveness to 
politics during the summer months prior 
to the writ drop in September. As we shall 
see, parties in Ontario and elsewhere 
needed an electoral cycle to get into an 
organizational rhythm. 
Across Canada there is plenty of 
evidence of political parties campaigning 
before the official writ of election. A year 
prior to the 2011 Saskatchewan election, 
the governing Saskatchewan Party 
launched TV spots to raise concerns that 
the NDP leader once lived in Alberta. In 
the lead up to the 2011 Ontario election, 
the Liberals ran party-financed videos 
praising their government’s policy 
accomplishments, and issued negative 
spots to slag the PC Party leader. As the 
official campaign approached, the Liberals 
continued to lavish self-praise, while the 
PCs framed Premier Dalton McGuinty as 
“the taxman,” and the NDP presented 
itself as a positive alternative. In British 
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Columbia, two years before that 
province’s 2013 election, the governing 
Liberal Party unveiled a so-called “attack 
website” that critiqued the NDP’s leader 
(CBC News 2011). On the eve of the 
campaign, the government spent millions 
to promote its provincial Jobs Plan, and 
the BC Liberals reinforced this with party-
funded pre-campaign and campaign ads 
that emphasized job creation policies. 
Two days before the election call, the 
Liberals purchased an infomercial 
wherein Premier Christy Clark chatted at 
a kitchen table with electors about her 
background and her government’s 
policies. The BC NDP countered with a TV 
spot that flashed the words “The BC 
Liberal campaign is based on personal 
attacks and negative ads. But we’re NOT 
going negative”. Proof positive: on April 
Fool’s Day, the NDP used social media to 
circulate a spoof negative video that 
humorously blamed their own leader for 
everything bad about the 1990s, from the 
Spice Girls to Marilyn Manson, and its 
cheekiness succeeded in attracting 
mainstream media coverage. Yet another 
example of pre-campaigning occurred in 
Alberta, where in 2011 the PC Party ran 
its “first ever” negative ad against an 
opposition party (Braid 2012). The radio 
ad contrasted the PC government’s 
position on an impaired driving law 
against that of the Wildrose Party and 
used the tagline “Danielle Smith: Not 
worth the risk.” This was identical to the 
federal Conservatives’ line against 
Stéphane Dion. 
Sometimes the alleged victims of 
pre-campaigning seek public sympathy. A 
mild case occurred in PEI a month before 
the 2011 election, when the opposition PC 
Party complained about the governing 
Liberals publishing pre-campaign 
newspaper ads. This pales against the 
outcry against the Saskatchewan New 
Democrats who prepared a radio ad in 
July 2011 which included two separate 
remarks by the Premier Brad Wall that 
were spliced together to appear as a 
single comment. In New Brunswick there 
was a tit-for-tat exchange. First, the PCs 
complained about a Liberal radio spot in 
2010 that used a Tory MLA’s quote out of 
context. Then, they were upset about the 
NDP spoofing the Supersize Me movie 
poster to depict PC leader David Alward 
with a mouthful of French fries. Finally, 
the PC website depicted Liberal Premier 
Shawn Graham as Pollyanna, an image 
that was later removed. For good 
measure, a Liberal cabinet minister urged 
the media to scrutinize how much the PC 
Party spent during the pre-campaign 
period. 
A more significant trend is that 
provincial parties are following the 
federal Conservative Party’s lead of 
damaging the image of a new opponent as 
soon as that person is selected party 
leader. In October 2011, the Wildrose 
Party planned to go negative against the 
winner of the PC Party’s leadership race. 
Wildrose prepared a video critiquing the 
leadership frontrunner, Gary Mar, and 
intended to run the spot on the TV news 
broadcasts that it believed were 
monitored by journalists. The 
advertisement was quickly updated to 
replace Mar with surprise winner Alison 
Redford but, as hoped, major newspapers 
did reproduce screen shots of the ad to 
accompany their news stories. 
Interestingly, the objective of the negative 
spot was not just to frame the new 
premier. Wildrose found that whenever it 
informed supporters through e-
communication about new ads this 
generated donations. Negative 
advertising, when combined with 
publicity and email appeals, is thus a 
fundraising mechanism to finance further 
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advertising (Flanagan, 2014) and is no 
longer confined to the official election 
period.  
Similarly, in January 2013 the 
Ontario PC Party ran negative spots mere 
hours after Kathleen Wynne won the 
Liberal leadership contest to succeed 
Premier McGuinty. Within a month the 
PCs posted an online ad critiquing the 
new premier’s cabinet, using photos of 
select ministers, gloomy piano music, and 
a narrator critiquing each one’s past 
spending decisions (Box 1).  
 
Box 1:  “How new?”  
(PC Party of Ontario video, 2013) 
Narrator: “Meet Kathleen Wynne, Ontario’s 
new premier, and her cabinet of big Liberal 
spenders. This is [Minister of Finance] Charles 
Sousa. Taxpayers are on the hook for $190 
million dollars, wasted, moving a power plant to 
save his own seat. And then there’s [Minister of 
Health] Deb Matthews. She allowed Ornge CEO 
Chris Mazza to spend millions on helicopters 
that were too small to perform CPR. And who 
could forget [Minister of Infrastructure and of 
Transportation] Glen Murray? He spent a 
million taxpayer dollars – on a toilet. What do 
they all have in common? They’re all part of 
Kathleen Wynne’s revitalized Liberal team. 
Turns out our new premier is a whole lot like 
the old one.” 
Wynne (heard in background): “Dalton! Dalton! 
Dalton…” 
 
This personal-level affront was 
followed in June with negative spots 
claiming that nothing changed with a new 
Liberal leader. All of the PC videos 
featured visuals of Wynne and McGuinty 
raising their arms together at the Liberal 
leadership convention, a colour scheme of 
bright reds and dark greys, and concluded 
with Wynne chanting the name of the 
outgoing premier. Although we cannot be 
sure, it seems that the intensity of 
permanent campaigning in Ontario was 
stimulated by the existence of a minority 
government, as occurred at the federal 
level from 2006 to 2011. 
Knowing the date of a pending 
election may assist in the planning of 
political communication. However, as 
discussed earlier, pre-writ advertising in 
the Canadian provinces predates the 
advent of fixed-date legislation. Moreover, 
at the time of study such rules did not 
exist in Quebec or Nova Scotia, and yet 
ongoing campaigning was in play there. In 
2012, the Quebec Liberal Party issued a 
pre-writ negative video that reproduced 
amateur footage of Parti Québécois leader 
Pauline Marois banging pots and pans in a 
student protest. The grainy images were 
obtained without the videographer’s 
permission from social media, converted 
into black and white, and slowed down in 
the style of a silent horror film. In Nova 
Scotia there was considerable pre-writ 
communication leading up to an 
anticipated 2013 election, despite the 
absence of fixed date election legislation. 
In December 2012 NDP Premier Darrell 
Dexter delivered uplifting messages about 
his government’s policies in a televised 
address. The Liberals released a TV spot 
deriding him for millions of dollars in 
corporate giveaways; the NDP responded 
by circulating brochures and creating a 
website that critiqued Liberal plans to 
reduce Nova Scotia Power’s monopoly 
over energy services. The NDP persisted 
by uploading a negative video to YouTube 
in February 2013 and airing it the next 
day on television; the advertisement used 
a blue colour scheme interspersed with 
an announcer mentioning Quebec, photos 
of the Liberal leader and news quotes that 
collectively inferred that he was a 
Conservative and/or a Quebecker (Box 2). 
The Nova Scotia case suggests that 
negative communication and trends in 
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permanent campaigning are not 
necessarily dependent on a legislated 
election date, nor on the perilous nature 
of a minority government. It also raises 
the spectre of negativity being directed at 
other provinces. 
 
Box 2:  “Ask Newfoundlanders”  
(NDP of Nova Scotia video, 2013) 
Narrator: “We don’t know much about [Liberal 
leader] Stephen McNeil, but we do know he’s 
opposed to clean Atlantic Canadian power from 
Muskrat Falls. Instead, he says Nova Scotia 
should depend on Quebec for power. His 
people are already talking to Hydro Quebec. 
And it’s written right into his party’s energy 
plan. Maybe Mr. McNeil should have asked the 
people of Newfoundland and Labrador how well 
Hydro Quebec’s treated them. So if you want 
Quebec Hydro controlling our power, Stephen 
McNeil’s your guy. If you want an affordable 
made in Atlantic Canada energy future, he 
isn’t.” 
 
2) Negative Campaigning in the Provinces 
 
As we can see, perpetual 
campaigning features positive and 
negative communication. During the 
official campaign period the one 
guarantee is that an incumbent party will 
coo about how wonderful life has been 
under their stewardship. In the Fall of 
2011 Premier Dunderdale gushed in PC 
Party videos about what an exciting time 
it was to live in Newfoundland, as images 
flashed of her mingling with smiling 
electors. In PEI Liberal video ads, the 
voice of Premier Robert Ghiz championed 
his government’s achievements overtop 
tourism-like images of the beauty of the 
province’s geography. In Ontario and 
Manitoba the incumbent Liberals and 
NDP, respectively, likewise featured the 
premier marvelling about government 
accomplishments and explaining to 
electors that there was still more work to 
be done. Saskatchewan Party videos 
depicted Premier Wall as a noble leader 
who deserved re-election because he 
turned the province’s economy around.5 
If positive video is more common 
among provincial governing parties, then 
comparative video is more prevalent 
among opposition parties, though a more 
comprehensive empirical analysis is 
needed to confirm this observation. 
Comparative ads that contrasted choices 
were regularly used by PC parties in PEI, 
New Brunswick and Manitoba: the first 
half of each spot consisted of anti-
government messaging before presenting 
the opposition as an uplifting alternative. 
During the 2010 New Brunswick 
campaign, a PC video depicted Liberal 
Premier Graham in slow motion set 
against a black background accompanied 
by the text “This is a sign of desperation” 
before transitioning to the PC Party logo. 
The narrator claimed that Graham was 
using “US-style ads” to disparage PC 
leader David Alward and that this was a 
crafty attempt to divert attention away 
from the Liberal government’s broken 
promises. A slight twist occurred in 
Quebec. During the 2012 election, a 
Liberal video began with an English 
narrator and text communicating that the 
party would create jobs. It transitioned 
into a warning that Pauline Marois 
wanted a referendum. Footage of Marois 
addressing an audience in French from a 
balcony while waving a Quebec flag was 
accompanied by English subtitles. “And 
our dream is to create a free and 
independent Québec” she says, after 
which the narrator reminded viewers that 
the advertisement was sponsored by the 
Quebec Liberal Party. This style of 
advertising seeks to persuade viewers 
that the message sponsor offers a friendly 
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solution to the problems created by its 
opponent. 
Negative advertising is much more 
sinister. The tone of negativity is 
worrisome in many provinces, and yet it 
was not present in all of the election 
campaigns under study. When governing 
parties used positive advertising they 
projected a regional political identity and 
positioned themselves as a magnanimous 
guardian of citizens’ interests. When they 
used negative advertising they attempted 
to reinforce their protector status by 
raising fears about the danger of change. 
In pulling the emotional lever of anxiety 
they tapped into ideological values about 
the nature of public and private sector 
involvement in the economy and/or 
juxtaposed leadership aptitudes. The 
Manitoba NDP’s negative spots in Fall 
2011 warned that the PC Party had a 
hidden agenda to sell off Crown assets. 
One NDP ad showed visuals of flowing 
water and hydroelectricity as a narrator 
cautioned that the PC leader, Hugh 
McFadyen, would privatize Manitoba 
Hydro (Box 3).  
 
Box 3:  “Keep Hydro Public”  
(NDP of Manitoba video, 2011) 
Narrator: “Manitoba Hydro: it’s our oil, it’s our 
future. And, it’s at risk. Why? Because [PC 
leader] Hugh McFadyen is a privatizer. He 
admits he played a central role when the PCs 
broke their promise and privatized MTS 
[Manitoba Telecom Services]. He worked to 
privatize Ontario Hydro. Now, Hugh McFadyen 
says he’ll open Manitoba Hydro to private 
investors. If Hugh McFadyen gets the chance, 
he’ll privatize Manitoba Hydro. Our rates will go 
up, and we’ll never get it back. Hugh McFadyen 
and Manitoba Hydro? Too big a risk.” 
 
This fear-mongering of 
privatization by the Manitoba PC party 
was a staple of NDP campaigns in the 
2003 and 2007 elections. In 2011, it was 
reinforced in other ads that raised 
concerns that McFadyen was too big a 
risk because little was known about him, 
because of the callous decisions of past PC 
administrations, and by drawing attention 
to his crisp business suits which were 
used as a totem for uncaring spending 
cuts. Somewhat similar to this messaging 
was the PC Party of Nova Scotia’s tagline 
of “risky NDP” in radio ads during the 
2009 Nova Scotia campaign. In that case, 
the government party warned voters of 
the Ontario New Democrats’ deficit 
financing in the 1990s, and also alleged 
that the Nova Scotia NDP accepted illegal 
donations from unions. Such warnings 
about the Ontario NDP’s failings have 
been a common refrain in anti-NDP 
communication across Canada for years. 
Fear-mongering was a staple in 
Saskatchewan, too. In Fall 2011 the 
SaskParty ran negative spots reminding 
electors of the failings of past NDP 
governments in the province. They 
labelled NDP leader Dwain Lingenfelter as 
a hypocrite who could not be trusted and 
portrayed him as an Albertan with the 
implication that he did not understand 
Saskatchewanians’ concerns. The design 
of these ads was nearly identical to the 
federal Conservatives’ portrayal of 
Michael Ignatieff as an American outsider. 
This federal mimicking previously 
occurred in the 2007 Saskatchewan 
election when the NDP used negative ads 
to warn citizens of the SaskParty’s alleged 
hidden agenda. That was the same 
narrative of fear that the Paul Martin 
Liberals used against Harper and, as we 
have just seen, which was also employed 
by the Manitoba NDP in 2011. 
The smallest provinces of 
Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island 
appear to be outliers with respect to their 
aversion to negative advertising and 
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inoculation from federal trends. The tone 
of the PEI campaign was considered to be 
more negative than in the past yet the 
most adversarial tactic was a 
comparatively minor flap over the PC 
Party’s newspaper ads concerning alleged 
government misspending on an 
immigrant investment program 
(McKenna and Desserud 2013). Ross 
Reid, the campaign manager for the 
incumbent PC Party of Newfoundland, 
advises that going negative in 2011 was 
never a serious consideration for his 
party for two reasons: “One, because, 
we’re not convinced it works. Secondly, it 
would have been completely counter to 
the image of Kathy Dunderdale. It would 
have been sending a mixed message. It 
was never considered…I don’t remember 
a conversation, ever, where we talked 
about using negative advertising…I think 
it’s bad for the system. It’s bad for the 
process. So I don’t like it” (Reid 2012). 
This stands in contrast to the views of 
Ontario Liberal campaign director Don 
Guy who had this to say about negative 
advertising and the value of pre-writ 
electioneering: “Whether it’s received as 
being mean or negative 
campaigning…The most important 
thing…is are we delivering information 
that the voter can relate to and finds 
useful….And the one thing that we did 
right in this last campaign, in 2011, and 
why we were able to close the gap, is we 
figured out that voters were going to start 
paying attention about a month before the 
writ was actually dropped” (Fowlie 
2012). The size of the provincial 
community, local political culture, and 
relationship with federal parties (at the 
time the Newfoundland PC party had 
limited contact with its national cousin) 
are among the factors that contribute to 
the presence of negative communication 
in provincial campaigns. 
 
 
c) e-Campaigning in the Provinces 
 
Communications technology has 
profoundly changed political 
campaigning, including the 
democratization of video communication. 
It is easy to create video and upload it to a 
party’s official website, to YouTube, or 
elsewhere. This is an attractive 
proposition because of the low cost and 
potential for emotional resonance. As 
Danie Pitre, an NDP communications 
officer in New Brunswick, explained in 
2010: “Unfortunately we don’t have the 
budget to be doing TV and radio ads. But 
we have realized that with YouTube and 
social media sites like Facebook and 
Twitter, we can still promote our 
campaign” (Nabuurs 2010: A1). Political 
parties across Canada now routinely 
upload videos which range from unedited 
campaign trail footage to professionally-
produced TV-quality spots. 
The types of online video generally 
mirror trends in offline video. Prior to the 
2011 provincial election, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Liberal 
Party used social media to promote a 
cartoon video in which a water droplet 
named Winston was informed by a 
narrator about the downsides of the 
Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project, 
including that the deal would benefit 
other provinces. In Ontario, the Liberal 
and PC parties launched multiple 
websites for the purpose of promoting 
negative videos and negative news 
coverage of their opponents. The 
Saskatchewan NDP created Flash 
animation videos to draw attention to 
their policy priorities such as health care; 
however, its video of events from the 
campaign trail suffered from weak 
production values and poor editing. In 
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British Columbia, an online video issued 
by the Liberal Party featured footage of 
the 2013 provincial leaders’ debate, 
which raised concerns about copyright 
because the parties agreed not to 
reproduce debate material. 
During the studied period there is 
one incidence of Web video that is 
especially noteworthy, even though the 
study of e-campaigning by interest groups 
and private citizens is beyond the scope of 
this article. Towards the end of the 2012 
Alberta campaign, the website 
www.ineverthoughtidvotepc.com 
attracted media attention, and its lone 
YouTube video went viral (Gerson 2012). 
The spot featured young people urging 
Albertans to vote strategically in order to 
prevent a Wildrose government. It was 
five times longer than a standard 30-
second TV advertisement and included 
language that would not appear in 
mainstream media (see excerpts in Box 
4).  
 
 
Box 4:  “I never thought I’d vote PC” 
(unidentified Alberta citizens group video, 2012) 
Woman 1: “[Wildrose leader] Danielle Smith 
thinks the Flintstones is historically accurate.” 
Man 1 [commenting on Wildrose healthcare and 
budget plans]: “But how the fuck are they going 
to do it, y’all?” 
Woman 1: “Danielle Smith doesn’t believe in 
gravity.” 
Man 2 [referring to earlier campaign gaffe]: 
“And I heard her bus has tit wheels.” 
Man 1: “Seriously. So, fuck it. I’m voting PC. 
Latino-ass me is voting PC.” 
Man 2: “Listen, I want you to know, it’s not like I 
have a hard-on for PCs. I would rather have my 
face eaten off by rodents.” 
Man 1: “Vote strategically. Vote for people you 
think are good, man.” 
 
 
Because the “I never thought I’d 
vote PC” video was created and posted by 
an unidentified sponsor it fell outside of 
normal election finance regulations. This 
serves as a reminder that the rules of the 
game are changing: political parties are 
increasingly vulnerable at any point of the 
electoral cycle to unregulated negative 
video that is created and uploaded by 
pressure groups and by unknown political 
opponents. 
 
Implications 
 
This descriptive account is a first 
step towards systematic research about 
negative advertising, permanent 
campaigning and digital video at the 
provincial level of Canadian politics. We 
can infer that the introduction of fixed 
date elections incentivizes pre-campaign 
electioneering, but that alone does not 
explain the presence of these phenomena. 
New technologies are helping provincial 
parties reach wider audiences, especially 
given their relative lack of resources 
compared to their federal counterparts. 
Importantly, online video is not subject to 
the same technical, content or regulatory 
constraints as television. Digital video can 
inhibit the ability of established political 
actors to control the campaign narrative, 
though its aesthetics can also reinforce 
unwelcome perceptions of the sponsor’s 
amateurism. It can be a strong return on 
investment because of its ability to 
generate publicity and attract donations.  
Another observation concerns the 
similarities of political communication 
across Canada. The government party 
uses the timeworn tactic of championing 
its stewardship and scaring voters about 
the unknown. The opposition criticizes 
government decisions and presents itself 
as a solution. Strategies promoted by 
federal parties are copied. This includes 
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attempting to stay on a positive message 
track, or using horror-style video to warn 
of an opponent’s hidden agenda, risky 
policies or outsider status. The federal 
Conservatives’ model of going negative as 
soon as an opposing party anoints a new 
leader, irrespective of the proximity of an 
election, is followed in some provinces 
and is symptomatic of a global trend of 
promoting and denigrating leaders rather 
than parties or policy. The one defining 
characteristic of provincial videos is the 
presence of a regional dimension. This 
pits provincial economic interests against 
neighbours – hydroelectricity was a 
theme in 2011 – or presents a leader as 
the embodiment of a regional identity. In 
Quebec, federalism and nationalism 
continue to be the identity fault line. 
Lastly, there is evidence that 
political parties in small jurisdictions are 
unwilling to go negative, and that 
anywhere in Canada the proponent of 
negativity is publicly derided. Advertising 
and/or humour are used to depict 
negative messengers as meanies; another 
tactic is to seek sympathetic publicity by 
complaining to authorities. Sometimes the 
technical execution of negative spots 
invites ethical questions, including the use 
of quotes out of context or reproduction 
of copyrighted footage. But it is also 
common for negativity to generate 
negativity, given that parties that take the 
high road are eventually drawn into a 
response. Closer study is needed to bear 
this out, including an analysis of strategic 
decision-making which might be 
explained by theories such as the 
equivalent retaliation strategy that has 
proven to be successful in game theory. 
Trends identified here concerning 
permanent campaigning, negative 
political advertising and e-campaigning 
show no sign of abatement. An emerging 
area for future research is election 
officials’ efforts to make the act of voting 
more accessible. In 2013 Nova Scotia 
became the first jurisdiction to allow what 
was dubbed “continuous polling,” 
meaning that electors had the option of 
voting at a returning office on any day of 
the campaign except on Sundays (CBC 
News 2013). Continuous advance voting 
increases the incentive to operate a 
permanent campaign and to go negative 
earlier. Whether such communications 
would be of any additional persuasive 
value is open to debate given that the 
earliest voters are presumably durable 
partisans. It is a policy innovation that has 
significant implications for voter 
mobilization, and it increases the 
importance of social media. The 
emergence of continuous polling, and 
what it means for political 
communication, warrants monitoring. 
All told, this synopsis adds to our 
knowledge about the campaign behaviour 
of provincial parties and provides the 
foundation for empirical and normative 
study. What are the implications of 
permanent campaigning for provincial 
politics and governance? Is there any 
correlation between the tone of 
advertising and political efficacy? Is 
online video the unregulated Wild West 
and, if so, what are the implications? What 
is the ideal regulatory framework for 
political communication? The baseline 
evidence presented here suggests that 
these are among the many areas of 
provincial politicking that merit pan-
Canadian study. 
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Endnotes 
                                                        
1 In 2015, Nova Scotia Premier Stephen McNeil 
remarked that fixed election dates are a problem 
in other provinces, and he backtracked on an 
earlier pledge to introduce the requirement as 
part of a package of legislative reforms. In 
jurisdictions that have fixed date election 
legislation, dates are nevertheless subject to 
change: constitutional limits of five years, 
maintaining the legislature’s confidence and the 
authority of the monarch’s representative to 
dissolve the legislature prevail. A minority 
government may be defeated on a vote of non-
confidence, as occurred with the federal 
Conservatives in 2011, and the likelihood of which 
prompted Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne to 
request that the legislature be dissolved in 2014. 
The first minister can still manoeuver an early 
election, as Prime Minister Stephen Harper did in 
2008, as well as Quebec Premier Pauline Marois 
after her government tabled an early budget in 
2014 prior to a recess of the legislature. 
2 The author thanks Jared Wesley for coordinating 
the Comparative Provincial Election Project and 
Michael Penney for his capable research 
assistance. 
3 Most news story citations are not presented for 
space and readability reasons. They are available 
upon request from the author. 
                                                                                   
4 This was not the intended research design. 
Difficulties were experienced securing interviews 
with senior party strategists outside of the 
researcher’s province of university affiliation. It 
also became clear that campaign expenditure data 
are exceedingly difficult to compare between 
provinces; for instance Alberta, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and Ontario do not require that 
political parties disclose information about 
advertising expenses. Finally, space limitations 
prevent analysis of data collected about 
campaigning by interest groups, who played an 
active role in larger provinces in particular. 
5 It is interesting that two months after his party 
won in a landslide, Premier Wall authorized the 
digital release of a humorous video of outtakes 
and bloopers from the filming of his election 
campaign advertisements. 
